Research

My research investigates the nature and origins of intentionality, understood broadly as including both meaning and thought. Indeed, I (currently) subscribe to the hypothesis that language and thought are conceptually interdependent.

In particular, my thesis focuses on analysing three main kinds of theories: i) theories that ground meaning and thought in innate concepts; ii) theories that ground meaning and thought in phenomenal facts about individuals; iii) theories that ground meaning and thought in facts about interpretation. I aim to highlight the shortcomings of these proposals and combine their insights in a hybrid, multi-step account of intentionality. Currently, I'm focusing on innateness, concept acquisition, and theories of learning.

I like to incorporate findings in Psychology and Cognitive Science in my research, and often apply a Kripkensteinean and later-Davidsonian lens in my inquiries.

Some essays I wrote... (drafts available)

Is Intentionality Grounded in Phenomenology? – The case against Mendelovici’s Aspect-Phenomenal Intentionality

This paper focuses on Mendelovici's (2018) Phenomenal Intentionality Theory and argues that it is unable to provide the determinate truth conditions and reference it claims to deliver. As for its role in my thesis, this paper will be developed to include all Phenomenal Intentionality Theories, and to reflect on the nature of contents as truth and/or reference conditions.

The Open Question Argument, Meaning, and Disagreement

This paper responds to Heydels' (2023) objections to Zalabardo's (2023) arguments against Representationlism for moral discourse. In particular, the paper defends the idea that, when speakers are engaged in factual disagreement, they are using their terms with the same meaning. I argue against analyses that treat disagreeing speakers as engaged in metalinguistic negotiations.

This essay was written for a graduate class and is being developed into paper.

Cognitivism versus Non-Cognitivism about Metaphor (winner of Alpine Fellowship Prize)

This essay won the Alpine Fellowship Prize in 2024. Here is a link to my (very generalist) talk at the Alpine Fellowship's Symposium.

This essay argues that questions about whether metaphor has propositional content cannot be answered for metaphor as a linguistic category; rather, as for all uses of language, whether they express propositional content – other than their literal meaning – is a matter of context and how it interacts with speakers' intentions. I use Camp's (2003) cognitivist account of metaphorical content, Lepore and Stone's (2010; 2015) non-cognitivist account, and linguistic data to motivate my claims. My considerations are also backed by reflections on the epistemology of interpretation and metaphysics of content, later-Davidsonian interpretation theory (Davidson, 1986; 1993), and Davidson's (1986) discussion of the debate between McKay (1968) and Donnellan (1968).

MPhil Thesis – The Normativity of Meaning: Partial Reductionism and Guidance

My MPhil thesis focused on whether meaning is subject to the so-called "guidance constraint" – namely, on whether genuine speakers must be guided in their uses of expressions, such that there is a guiding element that gives reason or motivates their uses. I focused primarily on Ginsborg's (2011, 2012) (partially) reductive "primitive normativity" and Verheggen's (2016) non-reductive "semantic attitudinal normativity". Specifically, I explored whether meaning requires innate representations and/or attitudes, and whether it requires false-belief understanding and Theory of Mind. Finally, I attempted to sketch a (partially) reductive theory that takes perceptual experiences as pre-conditions for meaningful use of language, when embedded in a triangulating community where there are nomic connections between perceptual events, phenomenal qualia, and responsive behaviour.

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